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Chapter 1 
Religion and Knowledge: 
The Sociological Agenda
Mathew Guest
Knowledge at the Turn of the Twenty-irst Century
During the preparation of this book, in December 2011, Christopher Hitchens, 
the internationally renowned British-American writer, journalist and political 
agitator, died from esophageal cancer. Hitchens had become famous – and 
infamous – for a variety of reasons, but in his inal years he had used his public 
proile most effectively to denounce religion and call for what he called a ‘renewed 
Enlightenment’ (2007: 283). For Hitchens, religion is the ‘main source of hatred in 
the world’,1 the cause of countless wars and inexcusable human suffering; it is also 
based on ignorance and is an enemy of ‘free enquiry’, so that tackling the ‘problem’ 
of religion, as Hitchens sees it, is about raising awareness and engaging in a free 
public debate about the ‘proper’ bases of knowledge. It is quite understandable 
then that Hitchens should choose to promote his book God is Not Great not by 
engaging the intellectual classes of the American East Coast, but by holding a series 
of public debates among religious conservatives across the Deep South. Hitchens’s 
criticism of religion sits to some extent within a long-standing tradition of post-
Enlightenment rationalism, championed by igures like Thomas Jefferson, who, 
like Hitchens, associated the ‘new world’ with freedom not just from old political 
ties, but also from the tyranny and ignorance of traditional religion. Indeed, it was 
Jefferson who rewrote the Christian New Testament as an account of Jesus as an 
ethical teacher, with all reference to miracles expunged for the more enlightened, 
modern reader (Jefferson 2006). Despite his indebtedness to well-known 
proponents of the Enlightenment, Hitchens’s perspective is also irmly rooted in 
the circumstances of the contemporary world. A ‘renewed Enlightenment’ could 
be ushered in on the back of a broader democratization of knowledge, which in 
turn is part of the collapse of old hierarchies and the levelling effects of the World 
Wide Web. Religion can be challenged anew because the late modern age is one in 
which knowledge is no longer the preserve of a privileged few, but accessible to the 
masses via media that empower as well as intellectually enrich.
1
 Taken from a speech given by Hitchens at the university of Toronto; available at: 
http://onegoodmove.org/1gm/1gmarchive/2007/03/free_speech_6.html, access date: 2 
February 2012.
Religion and Knowledge2
Just months before Hitchens’s death, another iconic igure passed away: 
Californian inventor, IT entrepreneur and CEO of Apple Inc, Steve Jobs. Heralded 
as one of the foremost innovators of the personal computer revolution, Jobs 
became a charismatic leader within the knowledge economy, inluencing millions 
of individuals worldwide via his technological innovations, most notably the iMac 
computer, the iPod, the iPhone and the iPad. Jobs’s inventions are emblematic 
of the democratization of knowledge alluded to in Hitchens’s diatribes against 
religion, carriers of opportunity and empowerment that lessen the distance between 
the individual consumer and the global circulation of knowledge. Possibly the 
most well-known brand of the early twenty-irst century, Apple’s ubiquitous logo 
is the simple outline of an apple with a bite taken out of it, for some a reference to 
the Eden story in the Old Testament book of Genesis, in which Adam and Eve are 
tempted by the serpent to eat from the tree of knowledge. What was once widely 
viewed as a solemn warning about the sins of lust and pride is now symbolic of a 
consumer quest for knowledge, iltered by IT products and lauded as aspirational 
and progressive across the globe.
However, the optimism associated with Jobs’s inventions and inherent in 
Hitchens’s vision of a ‘new Enlightenment’ is not universally shared. Such is the 
paradoxical quality of late modernity that the same processes heralded as almost 
utopian can also disempower and intellectually impoverish, not least because of 
the uncertainty surrounding the reliability of the sources from which knowledge 
is now drawn. With democratization comes the destabilizing of old certainties. 
Related anxieties have a long and painful provenance and religious identities have 
often had a signiicant stake in emerging debates. Hitchens’s comments illustrate 
how questions concerning the status of the knowledge claims made by religious 
people are of enduring importance; controversies over the weight which should 
be properly attached to such claims have framed and shaped some of the most 
tumultuous periods in history. New religious movements emerge on the basis of 
novel and often controversial understandings of how the world works and about 
where individuals and communities can turn for ultimate meaning; governments 
have risen and fallen on the basis of such differences and global conlict has often 
raged around competing claims about what constitutes a legitimate interpretation 
of religious texts or of where religious truth is to be found.
This book addresses the relationship between religion and knowledge from 
a sociological perspective, building on historical foundations but offering a 
distinctive focus on the changing status of religious phenomena at the turn of the 
twenty-irst century. The chapters approach the theme in various ways, focusing 
on religion as a channel or institutional context for the production of knowledge, 
religion as a form of knowledge to be transmitted or conveyed and religion as a 
social ield in which controversies about knowledge are fought out. In recent years, 
a series of factors have brought questions of the relationship between religion 
and knowledge into sharp relief and reconigured them into a set of concerns that 
have acute social relevance. This introductory essay addresses these conditions 
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and their signiicance, before exploring some emerging questions concerning the 
status of religion in the light of developments in the sociology of knowledge.
Religion and Knowledge in the Contemporary Context
There are three main reasons why the relationship between religion and 
knowledge is in particular need of sociological investigation at the present time. 
First, the contemporary world makes an unprecedented volume of knowledge 
available on an unprecedented scale. This is often cynically characterized as a 
surfeit of information, driven by the twin forces of late modernity: information 
and communications technology and consumerist economics (Lyon 2000), which 
together shape a global market in information, much of it delivered in conveniently 
packaged consumer products or expressed in readily accessible forms on the 
Internet. Such developments have engendered widespread concerns about an 
‘information glut’. In the age in which the Internet and related new media shape 
so many of our experiences, information – rather than being rare and precious – is 
now relatively inexpensive and plentiful and, as a consequence, often radically 
devalued (Shenk 1997: 26–7). These developments raise a host of new questions 
about the nature of knowledge and the authority upon which it rests, about how the 
forces of late modernity challenge or undermine traditional sources of knowledge 
and about the reliability and accessibility of the forms of knowledge that appear 
to be taking their place. For example, what does the rise of Wikipedia tell us about 
the democratization of access to knowledge and of the authorship of knowledge 
and what do such changes suggest about shifting conceptions of expertise, training 
and leadership? Does the acceleration of knowledge production and dissemination 
in late modernity heighten secularization by undermining traditional authorities or 
does it generate new opportunities for religious innovation? Put another way, if our 
lives are now framed by what management consultant Peter Drucker (1969) calls 
the ‘knowledge economy’, what are the implications of this for the social status of 
religion? When the handling and distribution of information appears increasingly 
central to the global economy, how do knowledge claims made by agents and 
opponents of religion feature in wider processes of knowledge production? 
Perhaps most strikingly, the acceleration of knowledge dissemination across the 
globe has seen the prominence of religious movements within public knowledge 
considerably heightened. Whether driven by a sense of scandal, controversy or a 
group’s own ambitions for a public platform, religion has been re-positioned from 
being marginal to taking centre stage within human consciousness, intensifying 
the perception that religion is a socio-political force to be reckoned with.
Secondly, disillusionment with authority igures and established institutions 
appears to have reached a new peak, with the global economic downturn, scandals 
about political corruption and inancial mismanagement and electoral apathy 
contributing to a sense that conventional systems of governance and capitalist 
economics have failed. Against this background, narratives of re-enchantment or 
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non-Western rationality have renewed resonance, feeding into expressions of social 
discontent, protest and a quest for new meaning. Some look to Eastern philosophy, 
others to a self-focused spirituality that has no truck with ‘tradition’, others to 
Judaeo-Christian traditions of the past, such as Celtic Christianity or monasticism, 
all of whose apparent antiquity or cultural exoticism appears untainted by the 
polluting inluence of Western culture. The drift of current sociological research is 
towards emphasizing subjectivity, individualism and experience as key motivating 
factors (for example, Heelas and Woodhead 2005); what it often fails to address 
is how such developments constitute alternative ways of apprehending the world 
and thus shared bodies of knowledge (Shimazono 1996). A striking example is 
the religious self-help literature, which is rightly highlighted for intensifying 
the cultural importance of self-focused spiritualities. But these best sellers also 
constitute new channels of knowledge acquisition, with their own readership 
and shared cultures of understanding (Frykholm 2004), triggering novel forms 
of religious empowerment and, potentially, subversion. They also present a 
contradiction: while celebrating the self and the authority of the self, the authors 
of self-help literature are knowledge gurus in their own right who assume the task 
of telling the reader what to do and how to think. For example, the signiicance of 
evangelical Joel Osteen, author of Become a Better You and Your Best Life Now, 
is not just as a measure of individualization, but as one stream in a market of new 
perspectives, offering new ways of understanding the world (Sødal 2010). Mistrust 
of governments also has implications for education, often creating a discomfort 
with state-sponsored institutions as contexts for secondary socialization, especially 
sensitive when issues of moral or religious education are concerned and fraught 
when central government is perceived to support a particular agenda. Here, the 
emergence of dissonant bodies of knowledge, such as creationism or intelligent 
design, takes on signiicance, not just in relecting the destabilization of Western 
science, but also as political protest and a resurgence of counter-cultural religion. 
When such issues are connected to what is taught in the classroom – and thus 
endorsed as ‘legitimate’ knowledge – the public relevance of religion as a focus of 
social tensions becomes even more salient.
Finally, in an age shaped by post-9/11 perceptions of religion and its capacity to 
foster social deviance, there is more support for the agendas of those whose aim is to 
monitor, control or delimit the processes whereby religious knowledge is generated, 
publicized and circulated among interested parties. The UK government’s ‘Prevent’ 
agenda presents a striking illustration2 and its concern for how religious ideologies 
contribute to social conlict and incitements to hatred has triggered debates about 
the inluence of religious groups on university campuses, the ‘proper’ training 
of Muslim Imams and the use of the Internet for recruitment to terrorist groups. 
It is in reference to such sites for the transmission of religious knowledge that 
politicians devise new forms of community intervention, focused on inluencing 
2
 See http://www.homeofice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/review-of-prevent-strategy/, 
access date: 10 February 2012.
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the dissemination of religious knowledge and on steering those instrumental 
in its formulation towards a less culturally subversive agenda. Claims about an 
insidious surveillance culture engender worries about freedom of expression and 
questions about the limits of government intervention (Lyon 2003). The question 
arises: when does religion become dangerous and, when it does, how is knowledge 
about such matters appropriately managed? Moreover, what is the knowledge 
base on which governments devise their policies on such issues? The Internet 
age encourages expectations of ease of access to knowledge and transparency of 
knowledge production, yet the security agenda of Western governments has moved 
in the opposite direction, provoking questions of how knowledge about religion 
– especially religion viewed as deviant – might be controlled and how much 
classiied knowledge can be shared or made public. While religious censorship 
remains normative in some countries that have more centralized government 
control (for example, China), liberal democratic governments have addressed this 
problem by introducing counter-discourses into the public arena, narratives of state, 
national identity and democracy that marginalize religious ideologies deined as 
inimical to the desired cultural norm. Conversely, they also valorize constructions 
of religion that relect this norm, as seen in romanticized expressions of Islam 
and Christianity common among policymakers in Britain, both of which are often 
rooted in the same notion of ‘moderate’ religion: universal, tolerant, rational and 
respectful of difference (Gutkowski 2012). Further illustrations can be cited in 
relation to the treatment of Islamic communities in a variety of Western nations 
(see for example, Birt 2006) or in the treatment of New Religious Movements 
in relation to the deinition of laïcité in France (Altglas 2010). It is in this sense 
that the public negotiation of religious identities is always entangled with parallel 
emerging discourses of secularity.
Religion and the Sociology of Knowledge
These contextual factors achieve sharper illumination when they are grounded in 
insights drawn from the sociology of knowledge, which has a history of providing 
valuable theoretical tools for the study of religion. Knowledge – as distinct from 
information – connotes an interest in the active subject, about the act of knowing, 
and thus implies a set of questions that are quintessentially sociological. How do 
we come to know things, through what means and with what kinds of resources 
and how are such processes shaped by the social situations in which we ind 
ourselves? What kinds of ‘knowledge’ are viewed as most reliable and why? Who 
gets to arbitrate when knowledge claims appear to be in conlict? And what is 
the relationship between knowledge and power, how does knowledge bestow 
advantage, privilege or cultural capital? Thus, while Robert Merton may have 
pointed out that the term has been ‘so broadly conceived as to refer to every type 
of idea and every mode of thought ranging from folk belief to positive science’ 
(Merton 1968: 521), the concept of ‘knowledge’ nevertheless directs us to a 
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very speciic set of sociological questions, which are especially relevant to the 
sociology of religion.
Early ventures into the sociology of knowledge fused these questions with 
a concern to clarify what is true and what is false. This lay at the heart of Karl 
Marx’s approach to ideology, which he understood as thought alienated from the 
real life of the thinker, that is, knowledge that is misleading and thus in need of 
challenging, so that the true nature of social reality may be unveiled (McCarthy 
1996: 34). According to this line of thinking, phenomena can acquire the status of 
‘knowledge’ because of distortions in the social structural arrangement of society. 
The emergent sociological critique of power (Bourdieu 1977; Foucault 1977) has 
continued to inluence the sociology of knowledge and early analyses of ideology 
have given way to discussions of discourse, both concerned with how forms of 
knowledge acquire legitimacy and predominance. And yet an equally inluential 
tradition has moved in a very different direction, instead favouring a focus on 
knowledge as constituted through everyday life, as a ‘common sense’ phenomenon 
by virtue of which human life achieves meaning. This approach, epitomized in 
Peter Berger’s and Thomas Luckmann’s seminal work, has as its object ‘whatever 
passes for knowledge’ within a given context, regardless of its ultimate validity 
or invalidity (1966: 15). Berger and Luckmann’s work has also been important in 
reorienting the sociology of knowledge so that its quest is not simply to attribute 
patterns of thought to social conditions – as with the deterministic tendency within 
the work of Marx and Karl Mannheim – but to address the dynamic, complex 
processes whereby ‘subjective meanings become objective facticities’ (ibid.: 30, 
emphasis in original). For Berger and Luckmann, knowledge makes human life 
possible, as it forms the foundation of everyday life, emerging as pre-theoretical 
knowledge – including myths, morals and ‘common knowledge’ – and moving to 
ever higher realms of abstraction, up to the ‘symbolic universe’, a shared structure 
that has the capacity to render everyday life plausible (ibid.: 110–146; Wuthnow et 
al. 1984: 47–9). In this sense, individuals and social institutions share a common 
project – the quest for a coherent reality – and the sociology of knowledge is 
concerned with the everyday construction of that reality.
Within the sociology of religion, the latter perspective has become enduringly 
important, most obviously with respect to secularization, and what the sociology 
of knowledge can tell us about the conditions under which religious worldviews 
endure or fragment. The apparent erosion of a shared knowledge base in 
Western societies (for example, through lack of religious socialization and the 
splintering of knowledge interpretation), exacerbated by rapid social change and 
detraditionalization, raises questions about the assumptions upon which religious 
or secular truth claims might be based. This is not new and is associated with the 
long-term effects of secularization, not least the fragmentation of traditional forms 
of community, disenchantment, social differentiation and heightened cultural and 
religious pluralism, all of which can be traced to accounts of modernity formulated 
by Max Weber, Émile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tönnies around the turn of the 
twentieth century. They also emerge in parallel with the intensiication of knowledge 
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production outlined above. What makes these processes especially worthy of 
critical re-examination now is the evident diversity of religious responses to them 
and the implications of this for the sustainability of religious identities. While 
there are those who remain wedded to a ‘hard-line’ secularization model, which 
associates modernization with the irrevocable weakening of religion as a social 
force, its ever-increasing detractors point to religious phenomena that exhibit a 
proclivity for creative adaptation, reinvigoration and a capacity to forge alliances 
that reinforce their appeal and power as social movements (for example, Beckford 
2003; Casanova 1994; Davie 2002; Lyon 2000). This is not the place to address 
ongoing debates about secularization; the point of raising it here is to highlight 
theoretical implications for how we handle religion and knowledge sociologically. 
To take an example from the US, Christian Smith’s research into evangelical 
Christians during the 1990s (Smith 1998) demonstrates not simply the vitality of 
this contemporary movement, but the inadequacy of existing sociological models 
in accounting for this. Contrary to inluential frameworks originating in the work 
of Peter Berger, but also applied by subsequent commentators on evangelicalism 
(for example, Hunter 1987), occupying a culturally and religiously pluralist 
context does not necessarily undermine religious truth claims. Rather, American 
evangelicalism appears to thrive on the resulting conlict and tension, it is strong 
‘not because it is shielded against, but because it is – or at least perceives itself to 
be – embattled with forces that seem to oppose or threaten it’ (Smith 1998: 89). In 
the terms of the sociology of knowledge, ‘sacred canopies’ might not be as fragile 
as Berger (1967) irst argued and thus the possibilities for afirming and sustaining 
religious knowledge claims within advanced Western societies may be more wide-
ranging and less curtailed than many secularists – and many sociologists – would 
have us think. Moreover, processes of ‘cognitive bargaining’ (Berger 1992: 41–5), 
as believers negotiate their relationship with their cultural environment, may best 
be theorized as patterns of elasticity, rather than a simple spectrum ranging from 
resistance to capitulation. Striking illustrations can be found in the public discourse 
of evangelical leaders and shifting perspectives of evangelical voters in the run-
up to the 2012 US presidential election. While recent history leads us to associate 
evangelicals with the Republican Party and with a set of fairly intransigent 
moral standpoints, such as anti-abortion, pro-Israel, anti-homosexual, pro-small 
government and so on, empirical analyses of the evangelical movement reveal a 
more internally complex picture (Putnam and Campbell 2010). Allegiances are 
forged and defended across traditional lines and with different priorities accorded 
to religious, moral and political dimensions; what matters more – a candidate’s 
past moral indiscretions, his/her orientation to economic matters or the visibility 
of Christian references within the public speeches s/he makes? (Goldberg 2011) 
The connections between religious and political values appear complex and 
unpredictable, to say the least, and, as a consequence, questions traditional to the 
sociology of knowledge, seeking connections between professed values and social 
conditions, demand innovative methods of study.
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One aspect is the recognition of the different relationships between forms of 
knowledge and methods of knowledge acquisition. For example, there is an increasing 
interest in embodied knowledge, which opens up new ways of understanding 
religious identities and their relationship to culture. Indeed, the theorization of 
knowledge as embodied can be presented as a critique of Peter Berger’s cognitive 
approach, which foregrounds the cerebral, discursive aspects of meaning-making. 
Beginning with the question, how do we know what we know?, Marion Fourcade 
(2010) outlines how many aspects of human learning amount to a physical training 
of the body, which involves processes of socialization of which we are rarely fully 
conscious. While the most obvious illustrations relate to common social manners 
– the way we walk, the rituals surrounding dining in restaurants, for example – this 
approach has a striking relevance for religious phenomena, for example, in the 
learnt behaviours associated with pilgrimage, preaching and prayer (Mauss 2003). 
Michal Pagis (2010) has analysed how practitioners of meditation in the tradition 
of vipassana Buddhism receive philosophical teachings via sensory experience, 
learning about liberation from yearnings for worldly attachments via experiences of 
physical discomfort and pleasure. Pagis does not suggest that embodied experiences 
take precedence over abstract ideas, but that different dimensions of knowledge – 
the embodied and the conceptual – enter into a dynamic relationship of mutual 
inluence (Pagis 2010: 487). Another example is Bill Gent’s research into learning 
the Qur’an by heart among young Muslim males in London, which demonstrates 
how embodied techniques of knowing can be transferred between different learning 
contexts, such as the mosque and school; this raises interesting questions about the 
cross-fertilization of ideas and practices (Gent 2011).
On the opposite end of the scale are the most abstract forms of knowledge 
– systematized and codiied, at some remove from embodied experiences. As 
Fourcade observes, these achieve authority only ‘if certain rules are followed: 
standardization, reproducibility, consistency, and publication in legitimate 
channels’ (2010: 571). An extreme example, a ubiquitous feature of Western 
modernity, is statistics – aggregated data that are accorded special status in 
societies that prioritize what can be quantiied, measured and packaged into 
easily digestible portions. Again, religion has not been immune from such 
trends, as we can see in the use of attendance igures by evangelical missionary 
organizations to reinforce their image of success; in the popularity of standardized 
introductory courses as ways in which potential converts can be introduced to 
religious traditions; in the use of statistics within anti-religious polemics; and 
in the policing of religious education via the production and implementation of 
standardized approved textbooks. It is in their adoption of and adaptation to these 
forms of knowledge that religious phenomena exhibit their shifting orientations to 
contemporary culture.
It is worth noting that these different forms of knowledge – and of ‘knowing’ 
– do not simply map on to different cultural or historical contexts, for example, 
with statistical knowledge attributable to broader changes characteristic of post-
industrial society (Kumar 1978: 220). Rather, they capture ‘strategies of knowing’ 
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that cross cultural boundaries and, while different forms of knowledge may emerge 
to be relatively dominant in certain contexts, embodied knowledge and what Daniel 
Bell called ‘theoretical knowledge’ (1973: 378), to take one example, often coexist. 
Moreover, it is in recognizing their interrelatedness and directions of inluence that 
we better grasp how they respectively foster or challenge religious identities.
This approach is relected in Doyle McCarthy’s book Knowledge as Culture, in 
which she charts how forms of knowledge have, in late modernity, been reconstituted 
as ‘powerful cultural forces’ (1996: 10, emphasis added). McCarthy’s rethinking 
of the sociology of knowledge relects both a return to intellectual currents of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and a shrewd appreciation of more 
recent cultural changes. In taking seriously the power interests behind different 
ideologies, how claims to knowledge often mask as much as they reveal about 
social relationships, McCarthy echoes Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia 
(1936) as well as Marx and Engels’ The German Ideology (1846). At the same 
time, she moves beyond these writers, away from their social determinism to a 
sense that ‘knowledges’ are negotiated among invested parties and away from an 
understanding of knowledge as primarily textual or internalized, instead preferring 
Michel Foucault’s approach to knowledge as cultural practice. According to this 
perspective, knowledge is not to be understood in distinction from culture, as a 
more or less accurate rendering of ‘genuine’ social reality; rather, knowledge and 
culture are mutually constitutive and exist in complex, decentred relationships 
with institutions, discourses and social structures (McCarthy 1996: 44).
McCarthy’s reconception of the sociology of knowledge places the connection 
between knowledge and power at its very centre, with emerging ‘cultural practices’ 
considered in light of their framing by dominant institutions. A striking example 
is the penal system, as the relationship between knowledge and power is no more 
pronounced than within closed or highly regulated, hierarchical organizations. 
Indeed, prisons have the capacity not simply to police access to forms of knowledge, 
but to deine their terms as well. This is explored in James Beckford’s chapter 
in this volume, which is a comparative study of the management of religion in 
prisons in Britain and France; here, wider notions of legitimacy are deployed within 
institutionalized discourses, focused on order and control, but ultimately embodying 
state-sponsored understandings of religion as a public phenomenon. Comparable 
patterns can be observed in the way governments deal with religious education 
(RE) in schools. In Britain, for example, state legislation makes schools responsible 
for promoting cultural cohesion and compulsory religious education is in practice 
treated as a vehicle for this. However, the subject receives limited resources and 
minimal recognition, as central government negotiates competing pressures from 
academics and educationalists reluctant to recognize RE as an important subject 
alongside the need to be seen to encourage mutual understanding between those of 
different faiths, especially among younger generations (Jackson 2004; King 2010). 
Hence a reconceptualization of knowledge as culture carries signiicant advantages 
for the sociology of religion, although not without losing sight of empowered 
institutions as key nodes in the exchange of resources and the process of meaning-
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making. This is no more profound than when religion enters into a relationship with 
institutions charged with being the key producers and accrediters of knowledge 
within a given society. The remainder of this essay discusses this problem by 
considering the modern university and those who embody it and relecting on their 
impact upon the destabilization of religious knowledge.
Religion and the Institutions of Knowledge
It was the Victorian polymath Herbert Spencer who claimed the object of 
education to be the ‘formation of character’ (Spencer 1851: 180) and there remain 
some within the contemporary higher education system who maintain such lofty 
traditional ideals. All the same, in the light of recent changes in university life, 
certainly in the UK, the purpose of the contemporary university is now more 
associated with its capacity to ‘produce’ individuals who are enabled to contribute 
to the global economy – a project often assumed to have little truck with religion 
or indeed with any of the disciplines traditionally located within the humanities. 
This echoes Peter Berger’s (1999) argument that one of the enduring forces in the 
erosion of religious identities is the ‘knowledge class’, a term which Daniel Bell 
(1973) used to characterize post-industrial society and which Berger associates 
with the university educated élite within liberal Western democracies. There are 
at least two dimensions to this phenomenon: one has to do with the capacity of 
certain educated groups to maintain dominance among powerful élites and this 
often has as much to do with the institutional pedigree of one’s alma mater as 
it does with qualiications or skills. But alongside this is an equally important 
issue, which is more directly concerned with the value accorded to different forms 
of knowledge and the perceived intellectual compatibilities or incompatibilities 
between them. It may not be higher education per se that undermines religion, 
but that certain academic subjects tend to be more compatible than others with 
particular religious perspectives on the world.
The natural sciences and religion are often presented as epistemologically 
at odds, although recent research warns against simplistic arguments about the 
relationship between these different forms of knowledge (Evans 2011). For 
example, in a study of science professors at 21 of the US top research universities, 
Ecklund and Long (2011) found that a signiicant number of these academics 
afirmed a particular kind of spirituality, which was taken to be coherent with their 
work as scientists and involved in their work as researchers and teachers. As work 
overlaps with self to such a signiicant degree for this group, the most natural way 
to integrate spirituality into their lives is to express it through their work, raising 
questions about whether other professional groups – such as doctors, lawyers, 
politicians – may offer parallel examples of the integration of religion with other 
forms of specialist knowledge. Other research has challenged the assumption in 
the work of Bell and those inluenced by him that there is a necessary tension 
between the worldview of the intelligentsia and the worldview of the religious. Neil 
Religion and Knowledge: The Sociological Agenda 11
Gross’s and Solon Simmons’s work on university and college professors across 
the US reveals a variety of orientations to religion, calling for an abandonment 
of loose formulations like ‘the intellectuals’ in favour of a more empirically 
nuanced understanding of the cultural location and status of knowledge producers 
and disseminators within the higher education sector (Gross and Simmons 2009: 
125). Moreover, from a purely epistemological point of view, it could be argued 
that laboratory-based sciences and dogmatic forms of religion rest on the same 
kinds of assumptions – both are inductive and tend to foreground univocal 
claims about reality, with little room for uncertainty and a tendency to assume 
a straightforward relationship between evidence and the claims it is purported 
to support. The opposite argument could be made for some social sciences and 
humanities subjects, whose hermeneutical subtlety presents signiicant problems 
for religious believers whose faith rests on an unequivocal set of certainties and 
the avoidance of the ambiguity that often characterizes academic rumination. The 
social scientiic call for relexivity, which highlights the contingency upon which 
knowledge claims are ultimately based (Davies 1999), may be an even greater 
threat, as it potentially undermines human as well as divine authority.
It appears incontestable that, as part of a broader process of secularization, 
universities have encouraged a quest for knowledge that, at one level, has diverted 
attention from sources of guidance associated with religious tradition (Bebbington 
1992; Marsden 1996). This would seem inevitable within contexts in which the 
status of religious institutions as guardians of knowledge is gradually eroded as 
modernity advances. But the consequences of this in epistemological terms are 
far from straightforward. A de-validation of the supernatural may foster atheism 
(see Voas and McAndrew 2012), but it has also spawned the ‘god of the gaps’ 
and ‘death of God’ tendencies (accommodating religion within a framework that 
excludes the supernatural or at least accords it non-essential importance). As the 
chapter by Douglas Davies and Daniel Northam-Jones demonstrates, involvement 
in religious institutions and networks can and does coexist alongside highly 
sceptical perspectives on the truth claims associated with them. Even those that 
point to a supernatural dimension to reality may be abandoned or marginalized in 
the lives of individuals who otherwise exhibit all the outward signs of orthodox 
religious commitment. To lose faith in this dimension is not necessarily to 
disengage from the institutional structures responsible for perpetuating associated 
claims, although one’s orientation to these structures may enter into a process of 
painful and unstable negotiation that has little foreseeable resolution.
Following the transition from an industrial to a service economy, we enter 
a climate in which the acquisition of certain forms of knowledge is viewed as 
key to securing a competitive edge in the global economic marketplace (Kenway 
et al. 2006). Hence the growth of universities in advanced Western nations and 
among their poorer cousins in the two-thirds world, in which the expansion of 
higher education has become a major component of the modernization process 
(Shipman and Shipman 2006: 5). Universities become crucial for the validation 
of knowledge – and consequently of power – as a resource and thereby inluential 
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in facilitating lows of ideas and patterns of thought that inluence the perceived 
legitimacy of religious knowledge. Universities may be conceived as institutional 
extensions of Weber’s ‘iron cage’, promoting a form of utilitarian rationalization 
ordinarily associated with industry and being driven by a pervasive and ever-
expanding bureaucratization. The difference with universities is that they not only 
embody associated assumptions about knowledge, they also explicitly model these 
assumptions via the teaching and learning process. Critiques of modularization, 
the standardization of curricula and the expansion of the educational audit culture 
(for example, Apple 2007; Roberts 2004; Strathern 2000) all point to this issue 
and highlight the strong relationship between one of the primary carriers of 
modernization – bureaucracy – and the forms of knowledge prioritized within 
contemporary society.
However, few would go as far as to say that universities, especially in the 
Western world, exhibit a homogeneous rationality across disciplinary boundaries; 
as argued above, the epistemological assumptions underpinning social sciences 
can be very different from those framing life sciences, for example, and thereby 
foster very different orientations to religion as an object of knowledge. Moreover, 
universities as institutions exist in a variety of relationships to religion; therefore, 
their tendency to embody rationalistic assumptions has to be qualiied with 
reference to issues of ethos, subject coverage and historical connections to 
religious organizations. Contrast the overly secular ethos of some of the post-1960s 
universities in the UK with the Christian universities of the US; often teaching the 
same subjects, their institutional identities encourage very different assumptions 
about religion and its relationship to academic learning. We might also consider 
the argument that of all of the major components of the secularization process, 
rationalization appears to have a very limited inluence on patterns of religious 
decline in different nations (Martin 2008), suggesting that science and religion are 
by no means inimical as bodies of knowledge at the popular level.
Beyond debates about the intrinsic rationality of religious claims, there is the 
question of how universities adhere to the wider logic of the market economy. Jeremy 
Carrette argues that the production of knowledge in late modernity has shifted from a 
binary dialogue between established academic disciplines to a situation characterized 
by ‘self-regulating and decentralised knowledge productions in the free market of 
knowledge’ (Carrette 2007: xii). This analysis raises questions about the complicity 
of academia in wider economic agendas and how religious agents may echo or 
contest this dominant discourse. Carrette himself has, along with co-author Richard 
King, pointed to how formulations of ‘spirituality’ in Western democracies relect 
a wider neo-liberal agenda that prioritizes individualism and market deregulation, 
so that ‘religious’ developments become vehicles for economic values (Carrette 
and King 2005), and similar arguments have been advanced about the ‘Prosperity 
Gospel’ tradition in contemporary neo-Pentecostalism (Coleman 2000). Less clear 
is the status of different religious traditions within the ‘market’ of ideas operative 
in the pluralist contexts of university campuses. How do different traditions fare 
and to what extent do they enjoy freedom of expression alongside different claims 
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to knowledge legitimacy within both academic and social contexts associated 
with university life? Related issues are explored in Ian Fairweather’s chapter in 
the present volume, which addresses how students negotiate issues of truth and 
knowledge within the context of the social scientiic study of religious phenomena. 
The author’s own research into religion among university students across England 
also highlights the importance of social class and institutional identities in shaping 
localized religious markets engaged and co-authored by students seeking religious 
meaning in a new environment (Guest et al. forthcoming). In this sense, life-
changing transitions of a religious, social and educational character enter into 
mutual dialogue with results that are by no means predictable.
Religion and the Vocation to Knowledge
The issue of the role of intellectuals evokes debates about the status of different 
forms of scholarship and the status of the knowledge claims they make. For 
example, the long-standing debate about reductionism in the study of religion 
offers a striking illustration of how interdisciplinary engagement can illuminate 
dominant assumptions about the relative weight accorded to different forms of 
knowledge. This has been highlighted in recent years by the growing inluence 
within religious studies of cognitive science, which attempts to formulate 
explanations for the origins and persistence of religion, based on the neural systems 
in the brain. Researchers in the cognitive science of religion argue that forms of 
human cognition – the human act of knowing – thoroughly explain, that is, provide 
a plausible and evidence-based causal explanation for, religion. Some point to a 
speciic ‘God gene’, while a more common argument explains religion in terms 
of the evolutionary advantage it has supposedly bestowed on those who embody 
it. While this sits uncomfortably with many sociological (and psychological – see 
Reich 2009) perspectives that seek a more culturally embedded approach (Carrette 
2007), the inluence of cognitive science reaches well into the human sciences and 
well beyond its psychology-based advocates, with some arguing for a paradigm 
shift that demands a re-rooting of cultural explanations in the work of neuro- and 
cognitive scientists (Slingerland 2008). This kind of approach has been called 
‘eliminationist reductionism’, as it offers a causal explanation for religion that 
claims thoroughly to explain its very existence as a human phenomenon. Thus it 
easily slips into an imperialist discourse, claiming a privileged, epistemologically 
neutral position from which religious beliefs can be unmasked as misguided 
or fallacious, what Robert Bellah (1970) has called an ‘Enlightenment 
fundamentalism’. More widely accepted are the culturally reductionist approaches 
that explain religious behaviour in terms of social, psychological or economic 
factors, that is, conditions external to the individual and hence open to social 
scientiic analysis. Indeed, popular versions of such arguments are often used 
by public advocates of atheism and secularism, keen to ‘debunk’ religion as a 
psychological crutch, tool of oppression or cultural iction (see Teemu Taira’s 
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chapter in this volume). What both versions of reductionism share is a conviction, 
sometimes left implicit, that religious phenomena are best understood not in the 
terms expressed by their advocates, but by its dispassionate academic observers. 
Knowledge is somehow unreliable when iltered by the ‘biased’ perspectives of 
religious people, as it is when contaminated by the identities of academics whose 
subjectivities are often veiled in the interests of ‘scientiic method’ (Davidman 
2002). This speaks volumes about the way religion and rationality are frequently 
set in opposition within Western public discourse, which overlooks the internally 
consistent, rational structure of religious phenomena (Weber 2009; see Bourdieu 
1987) and the embodied, emotionally laden character of much religious knowledge 
and academic commentary on it.
The potential tensions between academic knowledge about religion and 
the knowledge claims made by religious people have been the subject of much 
intellectual wrangling throughout the modern period. One standard sociological 
response that remains inluential is Peter Berger’s ‘methodological atheism’, the 
bracketing out of questions concerning the ultimate truth of religious deinitions 
of reality on the grounds that sociology may only properly comment on what is 
empirically available (Berger 1967: 100, 180). For Berger and those who follow 
him, religion is a human projection, a result of the universal quest for meaning, 
but this insight carries no decisive implications for the reality or non-reality of 
the divine or supernatural entities believed to be real by religious people. The 
separation of sociological from ontological concerns has been adhered to by a 
large number of sociologists of religion, carried further by those who claim that 
one’s personal religious convictions can be – indeed, often ought to be – separated 
from the act of studying religion, if the disciplinary values of critical distance and 
‘objectivity’ are to be maintained.
The possibility of such mental compartmentalization has been questioned 
by a range of scholars from across academic disciplines, with the ‘disinterested 
scholar’ criticized as a Western myth veiling the perpetuation of power inequalities 
between east and west, white and black, intellectual and popular, male and female, 
discursive and practical, religious and secular. According to this argument, most 
thoroughly explored by anthropologists such as James Clifford and George 
Marcus (Clifford and Marcus 1986) and Talal Asad (1973), the very notion of 
scholarly objectivity forms part of a complex project in which an interrelated class 
of individuals lays claim to deine and objectify ‘the other’ and hence maintains 
its position of empowered privilege. For Catherine Bell (1992), it also represents 
the privileging of discursive over embodied knowledge, a deep structure within 
Western culture that perpetuates the inequalities alluded to above. For many 
anthropologists, and likewise feminist ethnographers and academics in cultural 
studies who followed them from the 1970s onwards, the focus of the critique had 
to do with Western culture, social class and masculinity. These were the factors 
claimed to skew academic writing in favour of the powerful rather than the 
impoverished, which often masked more than they revealed about the way things 
really are. Markedly understudied is the function of religion as an identity marker, 
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how the orientations to religion on the part of the sociologist might frame the kind 
of topics being researched, the kind of analysis that is being presented, the kind of 
knowledge claims being afirmed and those being excluded from the discussion.
These are issues which have concerned the sociology of knowledge throughout 
its history, from Karl Marx’s arguments about the deceptive powers of ideology to 
the critiques of technology and medicine issued by Michel Foucault (1989). Central 
are questions about the production of knowledge and the processes whereby it 
is accorded legitimacy, which are questions of direct relevance to academia as 
a ‘knowledge industry’, no less susceptible to critique than the discourses of 
politicians or the machinations of the mass media. University scholarship, that 
of advanced Western nations in particular, has as one of its key functions the 
perpetuation of norms of rationality that can be radically conservative, despite 
the apparently progressive politics of some of its advocates. This was understood 
by Thomas Kuhn, whose classic work on ‘paradigm shifts’ demonstrated how 
scientiic discovery often serves to reinforce existing frameworks of meaning rather 
than challenge them, with dominant paradigms only giving way to new ways of 
thinking after they are brought into periodic crisis (Kuhn 1962). Related arguments 
have been advanced about tendencies in the humanities and social sciences and 
about how emergent traditions of interpretation treat different forms of religion 
and secularity (Fitzgerald 2000). Long before he formulated his inluential general 
theory of secularization, David Martin (1965) called for the word to be excluded 
from sociological vocabulary on the grounds of its ideological associations with 
rationalist, Marxist and existentialist streams of thought. Consistent with his 
argument is Joseph Tamney’s (2002) claim that the secularization debate has been 
distorted by the cultural myopia of its principal advocates in Western Europe; in 
this sense, ‘Eurosecularity’, as Berger has called it, rather than religion, may be the 
more intriguing sociological phenomenon (Berger 2001: 194).
Karl Mannheim’s legacy includes his call for a self-critical approach within 
sociology, based on the insight that intellectuals are often agents for the generation 
and perpetuation of ideology (Mannheim 1940). Such a model of scholarship has 
been realized in attempts to maintain relexivity as a central aspect of the academic 
enterprise and is relected in McCarthy’s rethinking of the sociology of knowledge, 
which recognizes academics not just as knowledge producers, but also, and as a 
consequence, as producers of culture (McCarthy 1996: 110). It is paradoxical that 
religion and knowledge – often conceived as carriers of ultimate truth – actually 
relect the most interested agendas and most tendentious perspectives. The 
resulting confusion reveals a great deal about changing power relationships and 
the processes whereby religions achieve legitimacy or infamy; as a consequence, 
the responsibility of those constructing a ield for its study is most serious indeed.
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The Present Volume
This book follows a tripartite structure, focusing on institutions of knowledge, 
the knowledge economy and academic knowledge, respectively. Part One features 
chapters on some of the major institutions through which knowledge is legitimized 
and in which religion acquires a particularly important role. Beckford examines 
the negotiation of religious identity within prisons in the UK and France, while 
Fairweather focuses on how religion is treated in British universities as an 
object of social scientiic study. The family forms the focus of Elisabeth Arweck 
and Eleanor Nesbitt’s chapter, particularly the process of socialization within 
families with parents of different faiths; engaging with the perennial issue of 
how religious knowledge is transmitted across generations, this chapter draws 
on recent empirical research probing the challenges arising from an immediate 
form of religious pluralism. Part One closes with an analysis by Elizabeth 
Cooksey and Joe Donnermeyer of the Amish in the US, a religious movement 
whose identity has depended on distancing itself from the forms of knowledge 
and experience characteristic of modernity. This is a study in cognitive resistance 
and thus explores the sustainability of alternative bodies of knowledge within a 
contemporary Western context.
Part Two forms the largest section of the book and includes a variety of 
case studies which illuminate how religion and knowledge interrelate within 
the contemporary knowledge economy. Taira tackles the topical issue of the 
‘new atheists’, arguing that the work of public igures such as Richard Dawkins, 
Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris is best understood not in terms of a 
debate about knowledge, but as identity politics. Richard McCallum turns to the 
presentation of Islam among evangelical writers and hence to the way in which 
evangelical public discourse constructs the religious ‘other’ in a very particular 
kind of shared knowledge. Stephen Jones draws from his research into British 
Islam in delineating how new forms of knowledge inform emerging expressions of 
Islamic identity in response to cultural change. Sylvia Collins-Mayo’s chapter is 
concerned with religious knowledge among young people and with how existing 
perceptions of religion are validated through involvement in Christian institutions, 
while Dawn Llewellyn’s chapter explores how women resource and negotiate 
their religious or spiritual identities through reading and thereby engage in a 
more private kind of religious knowledge acquisition. Steve Fuller addresses the 
Intelligent Design movement in the contemporary US, arguing for a reassessment 
of its legitimacy as a quest for new knowledge, while Ryan Cragun, Deborah 
Cragun and Jason Creighton draw on recent empirical data in investigating how 
fundamentalist believers engage with theories of evolution within a high school 
context. Davies and Northam-Jones discuss the British Sea of Faith movement, 
drawing from recent empirical research into this collective of post-traditional 
seekers, whose scepticism about the supernatural has not undermined but merely 
transformed their involvement in organized Christianity.
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We conclude in Part Three with a brief section addressing the status of 
knowledge about religion within the academic endeavour. Peter Collins 
examines the construction of religious knowledge and identity among the Shaker 
community in the US, thereby reclaiming the material and embodied dimensions 
of religious knowledge. Rebecca Catto relects on the sociological study of new 
religious movements and how ventures into the realms of religious controversy 
generate their own challenges surrounding the ‘proper’ and ethical management of 
knowledge – knowledge that is respectful of its boundaries and yet respectful of its 
audiences as well. In this respect the volume ends as it has begun, with relections 
on the relationship between scholarship and knowledge and how religion is 
handled responsibly by those claiming to advance our understanding of it.
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